Introduction

This Paper
Let N be a set of players and X a set of states. Suppose that for each state in X and each coalition S (a nonempty subset of N ), a possible set of "coalitional moves" (by S) to some subset of states is given. A map from the current state to a probability distribution over the set of all coalitional moves feasible at that state induces a dynamic process on X. Noting that moves are associated with actions taken by coalitions, we call this a process of coalition formation.
Under such a process players receive (additive discounted) utility from the entire path of states. This induces a value for each player in the standard way, as a function of the going state.
A process of coalition formation is an equilibrium if at any date and at any going state, a coalitional move to some other state can be "justified" by the very same scheme applied in future: the coalition that moves must have higher present value (starting from the state it moves to) for each of its members, compared to (one-period) inaction under the going state. In the most general form that we study it, a process of coalition formation precipitates a Markov process on X, the uncertainty reflecting both the choice of the deviating coalition at some state (there may be several potential deviants) and the choice of state that the coalition deviates to (there may be several potential moves). At the same time, we do restrict the class of moves by requiring that for each coalition, moves must be Pareto-efficient for members of that coalition, under the value functions induced by the overall process of coalition formation.
The use of value functions induced by the scheme itself implies perfect foresight on the part of all coalitions: players expect and understand that coalitions may move in the future, and form (common) beliefs about the likelihood of such events.
A model of real-time moves demands a proper interpretation of the time period. Our interpretation is that each time period is an interval for which a coalition structure (and the associated actions and payoffs) remains a binding agreement. At the beginning of each new period, a fresh agreement can be written, with the going state a historical (but not legal) status quo.
Potential Contribution
The theory of coalition formation has traditionally belonged to the realm of cooperative game theory (see, for instance, notions of the core, the bargaining set, or the stable set of von Neumann and Morgenstern). Recent literature takes this theory in three important methodological directions. First, characteristic functions are dispensed with. 1 A theory can be developed for situations with widespread externalities, thereby bringing strategic games directly into the picture. Second -and quite unlike notions of the core or the bargaining set -the theory seeks "consistent" formulations, in the sense that considerations of "credibility" are imposed on the blocking coalition in just the same way as they are on the original situation. 2 Finally, the theory models players as being farsighted, in the sense that they care about the "ultimate" payoff from a move, and not its immediate consequences. 3 The static version of the framework we use embodies several of the models in the literature. But the explicitly dynamic nature of our definition possesses at least three advantages relative to existing formulations.
First, by allowing all moves to take place in real time, as it were, the definition allows us to bridge the gap between myopic notions of stability (such as those implicit in the core or the bargaining set) and the more recent definitions based on farsightedness (such as those in Aumann and Myerson [1988] , Bloch [1996] , Chwe [1994] , Mariotti [1997] , Ray and Vohra [1997, 1999] and Xue [1998] ) by simply changing the discount factor of agents. Extreme myopia would correspond to a discount factor of zero, while extreme farsightedness would be approximated as the discount factor converges to unity. [It should be added that we are particularly interested in the latter case.]
Second, the theory of blocking and coalitional deviations has been complicated (if not hindered) by the issue of multiple continuations following a single deviation. For instance, Greenberg's approach (Greenberg [1990] ) distinguishes between optimistic and conservative "standards of behavior", in which currently deviating coalitions evaluate the future multiplicity of other deviations in hopeful or pessimistic ways (see also Chwe [1994] , Xue [1998] and Ray and Vohra [1997] , which all suffer from this selection problem). This Knightian approach to the treatment of multiplicity can be avoided by borrowing more freely from the language of repeated or dynamic games, which we do. Future paths (perhaps probabilistic in nature) are evaluated using common beliefs (as embodied in the transition probability) and expected payoffs are calculated using these beliefs.
Third, several solution concepts, especially those dealing with far-sightedness, inevitably run into the problem of cycles (for an early discussion of this, see Shenoy [1979] ). Chains of coalitions may appear and reappear in the blocking process. 4 In the present approach, recurrent cycles of moves pose no problem at all. Payoffs from such cycles are simply to be evaluated as any sequence of payoffs is evaluated: by adding up discounted one-period returns over time.
A particularly relevant interpretation of cyclical outcomes arises from the possibility of constant renegotiation. Agreements may be torn up and rewritten, especially if the environment external to a particular coalition is altered by the formation of other coalitions (note that this would be irrelevant for characteristic functions, but especially important when there are widespread externalities). Is the possibility of such ongoing renegotiation to be ignored, as they will be if cyclical possibilities are somehow closed off?
To be sure, an explicit dynamic model also raises critical questions. Particularly relevant is the assumption of a Markov strategy for all coalitions. The extent of cutting power our model retains if all history-dependent strategies are allowed is an interesting and difficult open question. It should be added, however, that this sort of criticism also applies to the static models of farsightedness, in that the move at some node is taken to be invariant with respect to the mode of arrival at that node.
Summary of the Results
We begin with a formal description of intertemporal coalition formation (Section 2). Our main limiting assumption is that the state space X is finite. The extent to which our results can be extended to infinite state spaces remains an open question. In Section 3, we show that an equilibrium process of coalition formation exists (we use finiteness of the state space but otherwise the model is perfectly general).
We then proceed to "benchmark" our solution, using familiar concepts from existing literature. To do this, we study the class of deterministic process of coalition formations. We show that in all models of coalition formation that are derived from an underlying characteristic function, the class of deterministic process of coalition formations with unique limit states (essentially) characterizes the core (Theorems 2 and 3), provided that discount factors are close enough to unity. Apart from benchmarking our solution concept, this result is of independent interest because it reveals an interesting consistency property of the core (which goes beyond the "internal consistency" of the core established in Ray [1989] ). 5 Vohra [1997] ). Alternatively, one might exclude cycles by implicitly assuming that such cycles gives the worst payoffs (Mariotti [1997] , Xue [1998] ). Finally, one might study coalition formation in a bargaining context, in which infinite bargaining delays result in zero payoff (Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Vohra [1993] , Bloch [1996] , Okada [1996] , and Ray and Vohra [1999] ).
5 Green [1974] and Sengupta and Sengupta [1996] proved that starting from an arbitrary state, a sequence of profitable coalitional deviations lead to a core state in exchange economies and in TU games, respectively. There is a fundamental difference between these results and the one established here. They assume that players are myopic, so that members of a moving coalition do not foresee what happens Next, we consider deterministic schemes that do not necessarily have a unique limit (but nevertheless do not display cycles). We show by means of an example that noncore limits might now emerge. However, it turns out that such schemes yields absorbing states that always lie within the "largest consistent set" (Chwe [1994] ), provided that discount factors are close enough to unity. This result (Theorem 4) is valid without any restrictions on the underlying model of coalition formation.
However, the inclusion result of Theorem 4 is generally strict. Example 4, which shows this, brings out the fact that our solution concept imposes more restrictions on the final outcomes than the largest consistent set does. But this does not mean that the outcomes selected by our solution are necessarily the "more efficient" ones; Example 5 is devoted to an understanding of this point. This example also shows that the "unimprovability implies optimality" result of discounted dynamic programming, which lies at the heart of many modern formulations in dynamic game theory (see, e.g., Abreu [1988] and Fudenberg and Maskin [1986] ) does not apply when the entities involved are coalitions rather than individuals.
Next, we make some observations on cyclical solutions. These typically exist in situations in which core-like restrictions lead to an empty outcome. But there are examples in which no cyclical solution (and indeed, no deterministic solution) exists. This motivates a study of probabilistic solutions, which is the final section of the paper.
Uncertainty enters a process of coalition formation in two possible ways. First, a particular coalition may be able to induce two or more states which are not payoffcomparable, and might randomize (or be perceived as randomizing). Second, it is possible that at some state several coalitions have access to profitable moves, and that these are chosen randomly.
It turns out that such forms of randomization occur naturally in strategic form games, in the sense that randomization is often necessary for existence of an equilibrium process (contrast this with characteristic functions). Accordingly, we focus in the section on games in strategic form. The simplest (though by no means trivial) starting point is games with common payoffs. We show that for such games, every equilibrium must lead to the efficient outcome, provided that discount factors are close to unity (Theorem 5).
But this result fails when we depart from common payoffs. For instance, we show (Example 8) that a 2×2 symmetric coordination game may generate equilibria that hone in on the "bad" equilibrium. The stochastic nature of the equilibrium is explained in detail; indeed, we argue that such an equilibrium must be stochastic.
We turn finally to a detailed analysis of the Prisoners' Dilemma. Our solution concept applied here yield a rich variety of outcomes (though, to be sure, not everything is possible). The main points are: (1) cooperation can be sustained using deterministic after their immediate deviation takes place. In the model described here, individuals are farsighted and will need to forecast future deviations or moves.
schemes, while defection can never be sustained in this way (provided that discount factors are close to unity); (2) in contrast, stochastic schemes can support defection as an absorbing state, and can also generate cycles of movement with possibly some inertia at the cooperative outcomes; and (3) cardinalities do matter in pinning down equilibria -Example 9, which concludes the paper, makes this amply clear.
Coalition Formation
Preliminaries
We consider a dynamic model of coalition formation. Let N be a finite set of players and X a finite set of states. 6 Using the language of cooperative game theory, one might interpret a state to be the description of a coalition structure, as well as a vector of payoffs accruing to each player. In noncooperative games in strategic form, a state would represent a profile of actions taken in the stage game.
A coalition is a nonempty subset S of N . For each state x in X and each coalition S, define F S (x) to be the set of states achievable by a one-step coalitional move (by S) from x. A coalition always has the option to do nothing, so we include x in this set.
Let F (x) be the set of all moves from x; that is,
For each player, there is a vN-M payoff function u i : X → IR and a discount factor δ i . Thus player i's payoff from a sequence of states {x t } may be written as
This is easily extended to probabilistic paths. Let ∆(X) be the space of all probabilities σ on X. Then for any sequence σ ≡ {σ t } in ∆(X), player i's payoff is given by the expression
Notice that the static, deterministic version of this model embodies several standard models, such as characteristic functions and games in strategic form. But it can also encompass games in partition function form (Thrall and Lucas [1963] , Rosenthal [1972] , Ray and Vohra [1999] ) or networks (Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] , Dutta and Mutuswami [1997] ). Our more abstract description has been used by several authors (in its static deterministic version): Greenberg [1990] , Chwe [1994] and Xue [1998] are some recent examples.
Equilibrium
A process of coalition formation (PCF) is a transition probability p :
We interpret p as capturing the (possibly stochastic) transitions from one state to another. These transitions will be induced by coalitions who stand to benefit from them (see below). 7 A PCF p induces a value function v i for each player i. This value function captures the infinite horizon payoff to a player starting from any state x, under the Markov process p. Standard observations tell us that the value function for i must be the unique solution to the functional equation
We are now in a position to define profitable moves. These will be used to impose restrictions on the process of coalition formation. Fix a PCF p, a state x, and a coalition S. Say that S has a (weakly) profitable move from x (under p) if there is y ∈ F S (x) (with
Finally, say that a move y is efficient for S if there is no other move for S, say z,
A PCF is an equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF) if (i) whenever p(x, y) > 0 for some y = x, then there is S such that y is a (weakly) profitable and efficient move for S from x, and (ii) if there is a strictly profitable move from x, then p(x, x) = 0 and there is a strictly profitable and efficient move y with p(x, y) > 0.
Thus a going state is allowed to move to another state only if there is a coalition whose members all agree to move to the new state and cannot find any strictly better alternative state (under the going value functions). Moreover, if there is a strictly profitable move, then the state must change, and there must be at least one move to a state which is interpretable as a strictly profitable and efficient move for some coalition.
Notice that this definition allows for (but does not insist on) possible changes in state in which the initiating coalition is indifferent to the change. Note, moreover, that the requirement of efficiency can been strengthened further, but it is not clear whether such modifications represent a conceptual improvement. 8 
Existence
Theorem 1 An equilibrium process of coalition formation exists.
Remark. The current theorem extends to state spaces that are countable. Whether existence holds in more general cases remains an open question.
Proof. Denote by P the set of all possible PCF's. We construct a mapping φ : P ⇒ P, show that a fixed point exists, and observe that a fixed point of φ must be an EPCF.
We begin by observing that for every p ∈ P, a unique value function v i (x, p) exists for each player i, satisfying (1) . Let v i (p) denote the vector of payoffs {v i (x, p)} x∈X , u i the vector of current payoffs {u i (x)} x∈X , and P the matrix of transition probabilities (under p). Then (1) may be immediately rewritten as
Since δ i ∈ (0, 1), I − δ i P has a dominant diagonal. This guarantees the unique solvability and continuity of v i (p) in p.
Let S(x, p) ⊆ X denote the set of weakly profitable and efficient moves from x under p. Obviously, because x is always an available move, this set is always nonempty. Let S * (x, p) denote the subset of strictly profitable and efficient moves. This set may be empty.
Fix any ∈ (0, 1 |X| ). For each p ∈ P, let ∆(x, p) be the set of all probability measures q on X such that q has support contained in S(x, p) and q(y) ≥ for all y ∈ S * (x, p).
Clearly ∆(x, p) is nonempty and convex for each (x, p). Now we claim that it is uhc in p for given x. To this end, let p k be some sequence in P converging to p. Study a corresponding sequence q k ∈ ∆(x, p k ) and extract a convergent subsequence converging to q (retain original sequence notation). We claim that q ∈ ∆(x, p).
Notice that if y ∈ S(x, p k ) for all k then y must belong to S(x, p). It follows right away that q must have support contained in S(x, p). Now suppose that y ∈ S * (x, p). Then y must also belong to S(x, p k ) for all k large enough. Consequently, q k (y) ≥ for all k large enough, so that the same must be true of q as well.
Define φ : P ⇒ P by φ(p) = x∈X ∆(x, p) for every p ∈ P. Then, by the arguments above, all the conditions for the Kakutani fixed point theorem are satisfied, and there exists p * ∈ P such that p * ∈ φ(p * ). It is easy to see that p * satisfies all the conditions of an EPCF.
One interpretation of the probabilistic nature of a move is that Nature chooses a coalition randomly and permits it to enjoy a profitable deviation. In that case, the subset T might be bound by the decisions of the entire coalition S. On the other hand, if this interpretation is rejected, then other problems arise. For instance, why restrict the search for better moves to subsets of S and not other sets T which share a common intersection with S (where the intersecting members are allowed to go with the coalition that has the better move)? But this further refinement leads to possible cycles, rendering a conceptually satisfactory definition impossible.
Deterministic Equilibrium Processes
In this section, we narrow our definition considerably. We then compare this narrow definition with existing concepts, as a way of situating our proposed solution in the perspective of existing literature. To this end, introduce the following definitions. A PCF is deterministic if p(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} for all states x and y. A state x is absorbing if p(x, x) = 1. An absorbing PCF is one in which for each states y, there is some absorbing state x with p (k) (y, x) > 0 (for some k ≥ 1), where the notation p (k) describes the k-step transition probability derived from p in the usual way. Finally, a PCF has unique limit if it is absorbing and possesses a single absorbing state.
Deterministic PCF's with Unique Limit, and the Core
A classical solution concept is the core. At first sight, the core appears to be an extremely myopic notion, requiring the stability of a proposed allocation to deviations or blocks by coalitions, but not examining the stability of the deviations themselves. However, it is well known that an extended definition that tests the deviations of coalitions by requiring immunity to further deviations by subcoalitions gives back the core once again (Ray [1989] ). This means that the core automatically embodies a certain degree of farsightedness (insofar as chains of deviations by nested coalitions are concerned). We now show that each element of the core in an arbitrary characteristic function game can be "supported" (in a sense to be made precise below) as the outcome of a deterministic EPCF with unique limit. In other words, the core passes a further consistency test where nested deviations are dispensed with.
We also establish a converse that yields an almost-complete characterization of deterministic EPCF's with unique limit.
Fix a finite set N of players. A (finite) characteristic function is a map V that associates with each coalition S a nonempty finite set of payoff vectors in IR S . Normalize so that all payoffs are nonnegative.
A state of a characteristic function is a pair x = (a, π), where π is some partition of the player set into coalitions, and a is a payoff vector such that a S ∈ V (S) for any coalition S ∈ π.
A strong core state is a state x = (a, π) such that there is no coalition S and payoff b ∈ V (S) with b ≥ a S and b = a S . A weak core state is a state x = (a, π) such that there is no coalition S and payoff b ∈ V (S) with b a S . Obviously, a strong core state is a weak core state.
We now embed a characteristic function into an intertemporal model of coalition formation. Let X be the collection of all states of the characteristic function. For each partition π of N and each coalition S, let W denote the set of left-behind players
This unwieldy formalism is easily interpreted in words: a move is available to S if the payoff vector (restricted to S) is feasible for S, if the remaining coalition structure consists of the coalitions that S left untouched and some arbitrary partition of players that S left behind, 9 if the resulting payoff vector to all non-deviant players is independent of the particular payoff vector chosen by the deviating coalition, and moreover, if the resulting payoffs to coalitions in π which have an empty intersection with S remain the same as before. 10 We may now state the following proposition. Proof. We will construct a PCF p as a deterministic mapping from state to state, ultimately leading to x * . Let x * = (a * , π * ), where π * is the coalition structure {S * 1 , . . . S * K }. Let x be any state.
Case 2. Case 1 does not hold, and there exists a player i such that {i} ∈ π, and a * i > a i . Pick the smallest index i with this property, and set p(x, y) = 1, where
Case 3. Cases 1 and 2 do not hold, and there exists a coalition S ∈ π * such that a * i > a i for all i ∈ S. Pick the smallest index k such that S * k has this property, and set p(x, y) = 1, where
Case 4. Cases 1, 2 and 3 do not hold, and there exists a coalition S ∈ π * such that a * i ≥ a i for all i ∈ S, and either S ∈ π, or S ∈ π and a * S = a S . Pick the smallest index k such that S * k has this property, and set p(x, y) = 1, where
. 9 Hart and Kurz [1983] considered two formulations of coalition formation games related to this point. A ∆ game considers a situation that players who are left behind by a coalitional deviation S are dissolved and each player becomes a singleton. On the other hand, a Γ game considers a situation that each of the complementary pieces that S left behind stays together. Since we allow any regrouping of players who are left behind by S, our setting contains both ∆ and Γ games.
10 Note that, in principle, several correspondences of the form FS(x) may be written down that satisfy this "independence property": our results hold for each one of them.
For this construction to be sensible, at least one of the situations described must obtain. To see this, assume that Cases 1-3 do not hold. We show that Case 4 must hold. To this end, pick any coalition T in π. If it is a singleton, we must have a i ≤ a * i (because a * is a core allocation). We claim the same is true of all i ∈ T even if T is not a singleton.
For if this is false, then a j > a * j for some j ∈ T . But then, because a * is a strong core allocation, there exists i ∈ T such that a i < a * i . Clearly {i} ∈ π (because T ∈ π and T is not a singleton). But this means that Case 2 holds, a contradiction.
So we have shown that a * ≥ a. In particular, for any S ∈ π * , we have a * S ≥ a S . To complete the argument, suppose that for all S ∈ π, we have a * S = a S . Then π cannot equal π * (otherwise we would be in Case 1). This means that there must exist S ∈ π * (with a * S ≥ a S , as already shown) such that S ∈ π. So Case 4 holds whenever Cases 1-3 do not.
Therefore the (deterministic) transition from x to y is well-defined in all cases. It is also easy to see that apart from x * , x = y for every other state, and that there are no cycles. It follows that x * is the unique absorbing limit of this PCF.
To complete the proof, we must show that all the conditions of an EPCF are satisfied by this PCF. To assure this, we first choose the threshold value of δ * . For any individual i, let m i be the maximal payoff that he enjoys over all states in which he receives less than his core payoff a
where C is the total number of states, and δ * ≡ max i∈N δ * i . Begin with the state x * , and consider any move by any coalition S to x = (a, π). Let L be the members of S who are no better off in the "static sense" by doing so:
Observe that L is nonempty. Now apply our constructed PCF thereafter. Notice that the payoff to any member of S can only change if some member of L initiates a future move (and indeed, this must happen under the PCF). Let i ∈ L be one of the first movers from S after the initial move by S. Given the PCF, i cannot enjoy any more than his core payoff a * i after this move is made. The same is also true for the intervening period between the first move by S and the later move by i. We may conclude that i cannot be strictly better off (relative to the core payoff) by participating in the move by S. It follows that at x * , no strictly profitable move exists, so we are justified in placing p(x * , x * ) = 1. Now consider some state x = x * . Suppose that we are in case 2. By our condition (d) in the definition of the move correspondence F S , and given the definition of our PCF, it only needs to be shown that the stipulated move is profitable. Notice that
by the normalization that all payoffs are nonnegative and the fact that the strong core allocation is reached under the PCF in at most C periods. Combining these last two expressions, it is easy to see that
where the very last inequality follows from the fact that a * i > a i , and the definition of m i . Now suppose that we are in cases 3 or 4. Then there is some coalition S * k which is required to move directly to its segment of the strong core allocation, creating the state y. Moreover, by condition (c) in the definition of the move correspondence F S , and given our PCF, S * k will receive this payoff for ever after. Clearly this move is weakly profitable. To see that it is efficient, consider any other state
Following the same line of reasoning as in case 1, let L be the subset of people in S * k who are no better off (relative to their core payoff) by doing so:
Observe that L is nonempty. Now follow a parallel argument to see that there exists i ∈ S * k who cannot derive a higher payoff from the route precipitated by this alternative move by S * k . In other words, the prescribed move for S * k is efficient. Finally, notice that our ordering of the cases guarantees that some strictly profitable (and efficient) move is always made whenever one exists.
The following proposition describes an almost-complete converse to Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Fix some characteristic function. There is δ * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any collection of discount factors all in (δ * , 1), and for any deterministic EPCF defined on any associated intertemporal model of coalition formation with x * as its unique limit, x * must be a weak core state. Proof. Our first task is to fix δ * . For any x = (a, π) that is not a weak core state, there is some coalition S and b ∈ V (S) such that b a S . Pick > 0 such that b ≥ + a S . Because there are only a finite number of states, we may choose so that this inequality holds uniformly across all noncore states, all coalitions S, and all allocations of the form b that do better for S. Next, denote by M the maximal (one-period) payoff accruing to any player under the characteristic function. Finally, define δ * so that (1 − δ * C )M < , where C is the total number of states.
Consider any associated intertemporal model of coalition formation, with δ i > δ * for all i ∈ N . Suppose, contrary to the statement of the theorem, that there exists a deterministic EPCF p with unique limit x, where x is not a weak core state. Then there is some coalition S and b ∈ V (S) such that b a S . Let S induce the state y = (a , π ) ∈ F S (x) such that a S = b. Given the EPCF, starting from y, the system must attain x again in at most C periods and stay there. Moreover, for this to happen, some member i of S must participate in some profitable move z from y (for if not, all members of S must receive b for ever after, a contradiction to the fact that x is the unique limit). This means that
Now observe that
But this inequality contradicts (2).
Theorems 2 and 3, taken together, show that in the context of characteristic functions, the concept of the core and that of a deterministic EPCF with unique limit are (essentially) equivalent, as long as discount factors are taken close enough to unity. Of course, the core does not exist for all games while our EPCF does. Moreover, as already noted, there are models of coalition formation which do not come from characteristic functions. In both these cases the concept of an EPCF may provide new insights, as we argue in the later sections of this paper.
At the same time, our core characterization isn't exactly old wine in a new bottle. To appreciate this, notice that Theorems 2 and 3 would also have gone through if we were to take δ very close to zero rather than unity. The reason is simple: when δ = 0 we have the purely myopic case in which the short-sighted blocking intuitions of the core apply straightforwardly. But -as stated more than once -the novelty of the present case is the results hold when discounting vanishes. It is therefore not surprising to find that a deterministic EPCF (with δ close to 1) may rule out non-core allocations in ways that are strikingly different from those suggested by the standard definition of the core does. To appreciate this, consider the following example. 11 Example 1. The following characteristic function is related to the coalition formation game of Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez [2000] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [1998] .
contains only the zero payoff vector for all other coalitions S. It is easy to see that this game has a unique core state (coalition structure) {1}, {2, 3}.
We now describe a deterministic EPCF with unique limit. Because each coalition structure has only one payoff vector, we may equate states with (the five) coalition structures and schematically write down the PCF as follows:
It is easy to check that if player 2's discount factor exceeds 1/2, this scheme is indeed an EPCF. Now focus on x 1 . This coalition structure is not a core state. The only blocking coalition is formed by players 1 and 2. However, if player 1 is farsighted enough, she would not join such a move since she expects that player 2 would "betray" her by forming a move with player 3 to achieve x 3 . That is, she would be better off by not deviating from x 1 from the first place. The point is that our EPCF does eliminate the non-core state x 1 , but cannot do so by the argument that underlies the definition of the core.
The reason that x 1 is not stable in the PCF is that player 2 deviates alone, expecting to create a further subsequent move with player 3. Actually, player 2 suffers from a low payoff for one period right after the unilateral deviation, and enjoys higher payoffs for ever from the next period. Thus, player 2's motive for deviating from x 1 is really based on her farsightedness. Thus the reason why x 1 is unstable comes from farsightedness, while under the standard definition, x 1 is eliminated for an immediate (myopic) gain. These are very different arguments, yet they arrive at the same conclusion.
We end this section by addressing an obvious gap in our characterization. Theorem 2 cannot be strengthened to include all weak core states, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Consider the following characteristic function
, and V (S) contains only the zero payoff vector for all other coalitions S. The coalition structure {1, 2, 3} and its associated payoff vector (5, 5, 5) represents a weak core state (it is not a strong core state because of the coalition {1, 2}). But this cannot be supported as the unique limit of a deterministic EPCF (for any discount factor less than one). For to move from the structure {1, 2}, {3} to the weak core, player 1 must participate in the first move (player 2 does not want to deviate, and player 3 can only do so with the help of players 1 and 2). But it is easy to see that if player 1 participates in any move, he must temporarily receive strictly less than his weak core payoff of 5 and later, no more than 5. Therefore it does not pay him to deviate for any discount factor less than one.
On the other hand, Theorem 3 cannot be strengthened to exclude all states that are not in the strong core, as the following variation on Example 2 shows. It is easy to see that the coalition structure {1, 2, 3} and its associated payoff vector (5, 5, 5) represents a weak core state (it is not a strong core state because of the coalition {1, 2}). Consider the deterministic PCF in which the grand coalition structure is the unique limit, and all states map directly to this structure, except for the structure {1, 2}, {3}, which is mapped to the structure of singletons. It is easy to check that this is an EPCF.
Deterministic Absorbing PCF's and Consistency
We have seen that the narrowest restrictions imposed so far -deterministic PCF's with unique limit -provide an almost-complete characterization of the core. Now let us loosen the restrictions slightly by dropping the requirement of a unique limit, but nevertheless not permitting any cycles. This gives us the broader class of absorbing deterministic processes of coalition formation (recall the formal definition stated earlier).
We first show that this relaxation permits absorbing states that are not core states.
Example 4. Recall Example 1. Notice that under the EPCF presented there, x 1 is not immune to a unilateral move from player 2. However, player 2 deviated only under the (fulfilled) expectation of a subsequent move by players 2 and 3 to reach x 3 from x 4 . However, there could be another possible move from x 4 : by the grand coalition inducing x 1 (though not under our scheme). If player 2 expects this, there is no point in deviating from x 1 from the first place. But now there is no objection to x 1 : a non core state becomes stable (that is, becomes an absorbing state). Indeed, it is possible to formalize this by writing down a deterministic EPCF in which x 1 is absorbing:
It is easy to check that if player 1's discount factor exceeds 1/3, this scheme is indeed an EPCF.
Is this a counterexample to our earlier theorems on core equivalence? No, it is not, for this EPCF has multiple absorbing states. Example 4 tells us it is possible to "support" a non-core state as an absorbing state, by knocking out possible blocks or deviations by further moves to some other absorbing state.
Combining this observation with the results of the previous section, we see that the core does possess a nice consistency property in a "self-referential" sense: a deterministic EPCF with a unique limit picks out a core point. But when the self-referential nature of the process is dropped (by admitting more than one absorbing state), then the possibilities widen beyond the core.
Notice that one of the absorbing states in this example is a core state. The reader might wonder whether this must always be the case. The answer is no, but requires a more complicated demonstration (see Example A.1 in the appendix).
It turns out, however, that all absorbing deterministic EPCF's have consistent sets as absorbing states. This notion of consistency is due to Chwe [1994] In other words, a collection of states is consistent if every coalitional move from any element of that collection leads to a "domination chain" (starting with the move and ending within the given collection of states) such that at the "end" of that chain, there is some member of the original deviating coalition who feels that the move was not worthwhile.
The following proposition links (at least in one direction) the notion of consistency to absorbing deterministic EPCF's.
Theorem 4 There exists δ * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any collection of discount factors all in (δ * , 1), and for any absorbing deterministic EPCF, the set of all absorbing states is consistent.
Proof. Let C be the total number of states. Let M and W be the maximal and minimal (one-period) payoffs to any player. Pick δ * ∈ (0, 1) such that for any two states x and y in X and any index i with
. Consider any collection of discount factors all in (δ * , 1), and fix some absorbing deterministic EPCF. Let Z ⊆ X be its set of absorbing states.
Let z ∈ Z be some absorbing state. Fix any coalition S and consider any x ∈ F S (z). Use the notation x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m to describe the subsequent path prescribed by the PCF starting from x = x 0 and ending at the absorbing state x m = y ∈ Z. Because the PCF is an equilibrium, we also know that there are coalitions S 0 , S 1 , . . . , S m−1 such that for
for all i ∈ S j . Now observe that
, so that by (3),
for each S j and i ∈ S j . Next, note that
(because the PCF from x j+1 leads to the absorbing state y in at most C steps), and combining this with (4), we may conclude that
But this means (by (i) in our definition of δ * ) that
for all S j and all i ∈ S j . (5) proves that y, apart from being in Z, is an indirect objection to x. Moreover, since x is a possible move (by S) from z and z is an absorbing state,
Because z is absorbing, it follows that
y) (because the PCF from x leads to the absorbing state y in at most C steps), and combining this with (6) we may conclude that
By part (ii) in the definition of δ * , we deduce that
for some i ∈ S. Now (5) and (7) together prove that Z must be a consistent set.
Observe that the union of consistent sets is (trivially) consistent. This motivates the definition of the largest consistent set as the union of all consistent sets (Chwe [1994] ). The largest consistent set may be "large" but certainly not exhaustive: for instance, in the Prisoners' Dilemma the largest consistent set is a singleton consisting of the cooperative outcome. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the largest consistent set may be too inclusive in some situations (see, for example, the discussion in Xue [1998] ). One reason for this "over-inclusivity" is made clear in the following example, where we show that the union over all absorbing states (under all deterministic absorbing EPCF's) may be a strict subset of the largest consistent set.
Example 5. N = (1, 2, 3 ). There are four states, represented by the payoffs they provide to each of the three players: x 1 = (2, 2, 2), x 2 = (0, 0, 0), x 3 = (1, 1, 0) and x 4 = (3, 3, 3). We describe the correspondence F S as follows . At x 1 , player 3 represents the only coalition that can move, and the only move is to x 2 . At x 2 , only coalition {1, 2} can move, inducing either x 3 or x 4 at will. From no other state is any move possible, and no other coalition is capable of any other move.
It is easy to see that the largest consistent set consists of the three states (x 1 , x 3 , x 4 ). However, there is no deterministic absorbing EPCF -and indeed, no EPCF at allwith x 1 as an absorbing state (provided that the discount factor of player 3 is close enough to unity). To see this, note that player 3 can induce x 2 from x 1 , thereafter guaranteeing (using the principle of an efficient move applied to {1, 2}) that state x 4 will result forever. So x 1 cannot be absorbing, because 3 must have a strictly profitable move.
This example shows quite starkly why the notion of consistency may be too weak. The domination chain in an indirect objection does not take account of the possibility that a coalition (along the chain) may benefit even more by not following the proposed chain that leads to an indirect objection. Thus in the example, the chain (x 2 , x 3 ) leads to an indirect objection, but once coalition {1, 2} finds itself at x 2 , it will strictly prefer to induce x 4 . This is why the set of all absorbing states (under all possible deterministic absorbing EPCF's) is typically a strict subset of the largest consistent set. 13 
Deterministic Schemes: Absorption, Cycles and Efficiency
Example 5 in the previous section makes the point that the set of absorbing states (under deterministic absorbing EPCFs) can be a strict subset of the largest consistent set. It does so by pruning inefficient outcomes from that set. This suggests that our dynamic structure may be generally adept at taking out inefficient outcomes. Certainly, this is true of absorbing schemes that have unique limit (and discount factors close to unity), at least in the space of characteristic functions, by virtue of Theorem 3. For schemes with multiple absorbing states, this is not true. Interestingly, this failure is closely linked to the observation that Blackwell's unimprovability theorem for discounted dynamic programming fails when the objective function is vector-valued.
Example 6. N = {1, 2}, X = {a, b, c, d}, and F is described in Figure 1 . In the class of absorbing deterministic schemes there is exactly one equilibrium, provided the discount factor of each player exceeds 2/3. This equilibrium has absorbing states {a, c}. Notice that the payoffs from these states are inefficient. 14 To see why, first note that in any absorbing deterministic equilibrium, neither b nor d can be absorbing states. For suppose, on the contrary, that b is absorbing. Then notice that a cannot be absorbing; indeed, that a → e. This means that a move from b to c, engineered by player 2, has the following possible payoff continuations for player 2: the constant payoff (2, 2, . . .), the path (2, 6, 6, . . .), and the path (2, 6, 0, 1, 1 . . .) . In each of these cases 2 earns a (normalized) discounted payoff that exceeds 1, which contradicts the presumption that b is absorbing. The argument that d cannot be absorbing is an exact parallel.
So a or c (or both) must be absorbing, and there are no other absorbing states.
Next, observe that both a and c must simultaneously be absorbing. For say only a were absorbing. Then it must be the case that d → a. Now consider a move from a to b, engineered by {1, 2}. It is obvious that player 2 must earn positive payoff from this move. Moreover, for any δ 1 < 1, player 1's (normalized) discounted payoff must strictly exceed 2 (we use here the observation that d → a). This contradicts the assumption that only a is absorbing. A parallel argument holds for c. Therefore both a and c are absorbing.
This leaves us with only one possible absorbing deterministic EPCF, in which d → a and b → c. Indeed, such a PCF is an equilibrium, provided that the discount factor of each player exceeds 2/3.
What is responsible for the efficiency failure in this example? Observe that the coalition {1, 2} can engineer, if it so wishes, a move from one of the inefficient absorbing states a or c. However, a move from a only ends at c, and vice versa, so that both players cannot find it simultaneously worthwhile to participate in the proposed move.
However, note that if players {1, 2} were to simultaneously deviate at both a and c, the "double deviation" is indeed worthwhile. The fact that a single deviation is unprofitable, while the double deviation is profitable, seems to run counter to the notion that "unimprovability implies optimality" in discounted dynamic programming, and indeed it does.
It is to be noted that equivalence between the unimprovability of a single-step move, and optimality, lies at the heart of modern theories of repeated games (see, for example, Abreu [1988] or Fudenberg and Maskin [1988] ). Yet the unimprovability principle is problematic when the deviating party is not an individual but a coalition; or equivalently, when the deviating individual has vector-valued objectives. In our example, the double deviation is necessary because the gains for players 1 and 2 under the double deviation are realized in separate components of the double deviation. 15 This suggests that the unimprovability principle should be applied with great caution when deviating groups are involved. 16 To conclude this section, consider the following PCF which, while deterministic, has no absorbing states:
Provided that discount factors are close to unity, it is easy to check that each move prescribed by the scheme is strictly profitable (and efficient in the class of all profitable moves). Therefore this cyclical scheme is an EPCF. For discount factors close to one, the (normalized) discounted payoff to each player is approximately 2.25. This payoff vector is efficient. In what follows, we move on to a closer investigation of cyclical and stochastic schemes.
Stochastic Equilibrium Processes
In the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on stochastic processes of coalition formation. Uncertainty enters the story in two distinct ways. First, at any stage, several coalitions may have profitable moves. Which coalition gets to move may well be probabilistically chosen. Second, it is possible that a particular coalition has more than one efficient move, and that it might randomize among them. The discussion that follows shows that in many typical situations one or more of these randomizations may be necessary in order to generate an equilibrium. The uncertain nature of the process may or may not be intertwined with cyclespossibly stochastic reversions of the state of the game to some given state. Formally, a (nonsingleton) collection of states (x 1 , . . . , x k ) under a PCF forms a (stochastic) cycle if p(x i , x i+1 ) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i < k and p(x k , x 1 ) > 0. A PCF that exhibits a cycle will be called cyclical.
The purpose of the analysis that follows is to understand these phenomena, largely through the use of examples. A large part of our discussion will take place explicitly in the context of strategic form games.
Uncertainty and Cycles: An Example
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the "need" for cycles and/or randomization in certain situations. We do this by considering the following restatement of the "roommate problem". This is a situation with three players, any of two of whom can share a room. In each case, the player left out obtains zero. Moreover, for each pair of roommates, there is one who obtains a payoff of 1, while the other obtains a payoff of a (to be parametrically varied in the example). Details follow, couched in the language of a model of coalition formation.
Example 7.
Let N = {1, 2, 3}, X = {x, y, z}, F {2,3} (x) = {x, y}, F {1,3} (y) = {y, z}, F {1,2} (z) = {z, x}, and F S (x ) = {x } for all other combinations of (x , S). Players have a common discount factor δ. Payoffs for each state x are described in the following table:
Note that it is easy to rewrite this example in the more familiar characteristic function form. 17 The appendix contains a demonstration of the following
Observation 1. The game in Example 7 admits the following unique EPCF that is symmetric for any a and δ: For
This example (and the accompanying Observation) is designed to illustrate several points.
First, there is no hope of a general existence result for deterministic schemes. This is true of characteristic functions for which the core is empty (as the example demonstrates). While it is also true of strategic form games, we will also see situations in which stochastic EPCF's coexist with their deterministic counterparts, leading to new insights.
Second, observe that once cycles and uncertainty make an appearance, the cardinality of payoffs really matters in the determination of a particular equilibrium. In the example, if a is small enough (that is, a ≤ type of randomization can occur only when at least one member of the deviating coalition needs to be indifferent between moving and staying. Note that in such a case, the payoff of a player who is indifferent between these options has a very simple form. For instance, suppose that player 1 is indifferent between deviating and staying at state z in the EPCF when a > −1) ). Then it must be the case that 18
This property is not specific to the roommate problem. As long as (i) there is only one possible coalitional deviation, and (ii) that coalitional move is randomized, the indifferent player's payoff is exactly the same as the discounted sum of atemporal payoff from the current state.
In the next section, we will see several examples of the second source of uncertainty: that stemming from randomization over multiple coalitional deviations.
As a final point, we note that asymmetric roommate problems (in which the cardinalities of vNM utility functions or the values of discount factors differ across agents) may have absorbing states. Two examples (Examples A.2 and A.3) illustrating this are provided in the appendix for the interested reader.
Games in Strategic Form
In this section, we apply our solution concept to strategic form games. Such games are usually employed to describe purely noncooperative situations, but there is no reason why this should necessarily be the case. It is possible that subgroups (or even the entire set) of players can come together to write temporarily binding agreements. Under this interpretation, the period length is the duration for which a binding agreement can be written.
We assume that every member in a coalition needs to agree on a temporary binding agreement. This unanimity postulate is natural in defining a coalitional move (recall, for instance, the definitions of strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria). Models of binding agreements also use the unanimity principle very widely (see, for instance, the survey by Bloch [1997] and the many references contained therein).
The objective of our analysis is to show how the possibly stochastic nature of coalition formation affects efficiency in strategic-form games.
Games with Common Payoffs
It will be useful to begin with a situation in which efficiency is not impaired, and this will serve as a benchmark for the more interesting cases to follow. To this end, consider 18 The claim to be made follows from the fact that
the class of all strategic games with common payoffs, which yield similar payoffs to all players for any action profile. To be sure, such games are not without genuine strategic significance; for instance, a well-known pure coordination game
in which a, b < 0, is a special case.
Formally, consider a strategic game with finite player set N . Player i has finite action set A i . Let A ≡ i∈N A i . Player i has payoff function u i defined on A. We assume that for each action profile a ∈ A, and for all i and j, u i (a) = u j (a). For simplicity of notation, we assume that there is a unique action profile a * at which all players' payoffs are maximized. We call this game a game of common payoffs.
It is easy enough to embed this game into an intertemporal model of coalition formation. A state will simply describe the ongoing action profile, and F S (x) is the set of all states a such a S ∈ i∈S A i , and a i = a i for all i ∈ S.
In words: an action vector is available to S if it is feasible for its members and if the remaining players leave their actions unchanged. 19 To complete the description, assume each player i has a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 5 Every EPCF for the game of common payoffs with a common discount factor δ involves p(a * , a * ) = 1 and has a * as the unique absorbing limit starting from any a ∈ A.
Proof. First we prove that p(a * , a * ) = 1. Suppose not. Then there is some coalition S and a move to a state a such that v i (a, p) ≥ v i (a * , p) for all i ∈ S. Choose a to be some state having the lowest value of v i among all states satisfying the requirement of the previous sentence. [By the assumption of common payoffs and a common discount factor, the same state can achieve this for every player.] By not moving, each member i of coalition S gets a payoff of
which is obviously larger than v i (a , p), a contradiction. Next, we show that a * is the unique absorbing limit. To this end, we first note that if a = a * , then there exists a = a such that p(a , a ) > 0. Suppose not; then we have v i (a  *  , p) > v i (a , p) for any i ∈ N . So there is a strictly profitable move from a , which contradicts requirement (ii) of an EPCF. Now, if a * is not the unique absorbing limit, then the set C(p) ≡ {a ∈ A : for any k ≥ 1, p (k) (a, a * ) = 0} is nonempty. By the common payoff assumption, there exists a ∈ C(p) such that v i (a , p) ≥ v i (a, p) for any a ∈ C(p) . By the argument of the previous paragraph, there is a state a such that p(a , a ) > 0.
In order to satisfy requirement (i) of an EPCF, it must be (recalling common payoffs) that v i (a , p) ≤ v i (a , p) for all i. But it is obvious that a ∈ C(p). Consequently, from the definition of a it follows that v i (a , p) = v i (a , p) , and indeed, this is true for any state a such that p(a , a ) > 0.
At the same time, we know that
. This violates requirement (ii) of an EPCF, a contradiction.
Although games with common payoffs are special, this result provides a strong base for our later remarks. In addition, these results may be of intrinsic interest for coordination games. For instance, Lagunoff and Matsui [1997] have a related result (see also Corollary 2 in Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] ). They analyze a repeated pure coordination games in which only one player can change her action in each period, and show that for δ close to unity there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the action profile converges to the Pareto efficient one. To be sure, there are important differences, not the least of which is that our approach permits the writing of temporarily binding agreements.
Binding agreements notwithstanding, the finding of ubiquitous cooperation in commonpayoff situations does not extend, even to coordination games with non-common payoffs. The following example describes a 2 × 2 game in which there is an EPCF with an inefficient absorbing limit. 20 Example 8. Consider the following 2 × 2 strategic form game:
, (B, R) by x, y, z, and w, respectively. Assume a common 20 Kandori, Mailath and Rob's (1993) equilibrium selection is related to the risk-dominance of an action profile (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) , and in the example, something similar plays an important role. Indeed, in the example, the Pareto superior Nash equilibrium is a risk dominated equilibrium (1 − (−1) < 0 − (−5)). However, in general, the conditions for a breakdown in cooperation are different even in coordination games. discount factor δ for both players. Then the game induced by this strategic form game has a EPCF with its unique absorbing limit w if δ ≥ 
As we can easily see from these expressions, there is an incentive for either player to deviate from x as long as 1 − 3δ ≤ −1, which is equivalent to δ ≥ 2 3 . So the PCF is an EPCF under this condition.
The striking feature of this EPCF is that although x is the highest payoff state for every player, it is not stable. The temporary agreement x is upset by unilateral deviations, in which each deviation is bolstered by the fear of the other player's deviation. Notice that this sort of "meta coordination failure" relies intimately on the failure of common payoffs.
Note, moreover, that this EPCF represents an example of the second type of uncertainty and its effects. Randomization among profitably deviating coalitions may cause inefficiency in the resulting outcome. 21
The Prisoners' Dilemma
The prisoners' dilemma represents a leading example of intrinsic interest. We therefore study the EPCFs of this game in some detail. Consider the following 2 × 2 strategic form game:
where a > 1 and b < 0. Unlike coordination games, x no longer attains the highest possible payoff.
It is well-known that w is the unique dominant strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. Our model of coalition formation yields a more varied set of results, which we attempt to characterize in the following Observation 2. The Prisoners' Dilemma admits various EPCFs depending on specific parameter values:
Deterministic EPCFs (a) there is a deterministic EPCF with its unique absorbing limit at
there is a deterministic EPCF with its unique limit at
Stochastic and symmetric EPCFs (a) there is a stochastic (symmetric) EPCF with its unique limit at w
Observation 2 outlines a rich array of possible outcomes. Begin with deterministic equilibrium processes. Case 1(a) permits cooperation to be sustained as the unique limit of a deterministic EPCF as long as (and only if ) a is not too large. Although this finding is not unintuitive, it provides a different perspective on the relationship between our solution concept and the largest consistent set (LCS) of Chwe [1994] . It is easy to see that the LCS is simply the singleton {x} no matter what values a and b take (provided, of course, that a > 1 and b < 0). However, no EPCF supports x if a is too large even when δ is close to unity.
This observation does not contradict Theorem 4, in which a deterministic EPCF with absorbing limit was shown to lie within the LCS. The point is that once a is large enough, such EPCFs fail to exist. Cycles occur (as Case 1(c) illustrates), but Theorem 4 is silent on cyclical EPCFs. 22 Another seeming contradiction to Theorem 4 is Case 1(b), which asserts that a deterministic EPCF may support w as a unique absorbing limit. Notice, however, that the existence of such a scheme is conditional on δ not being too large, whereas Theorem 4 only applies for discount factors sufficiently close to unity.
Taken together, Cases 1(a) and 1(b) reveal two things. For discount factors large enough, if a deterministic EPCF with unique absorbing limit exists, then it can only sustain cooperation rather than defection. If, in addition, a is too large then the existence of such EPCFS is jeopardized: Case 1(c) shows that in such cases one typically cycles between cooperation and defection.
The remarks so far pertain to deterministic schemes. Stochastic EPCFs tell a different story. Case 2(a) tells us that in contrast to the deterministic case, it is possible (even when δ 1) to construct stochastic schemes with unique absorbing limit at mutual defection. The condition for this to happen can be interpreted in the form of a low enough value of b, the so-called "sucker payoff". That b matters is not surprising, as this payoff (induced by the other agent's departure from cooperation) is what creates the "meta-coordination failure" discussed in the context of Example 8.
Finally, Case 2(b) identifies (necessary and sufficient) conditions for the presence of stochastic EPCFs that exhibit cycles. Notice that if a is not too large then the cooperative outcome must exhibit some inertia along this cycle (p(x, x) > 0).
It may be worth pointing out that the conditions identified in cases 1(c) and 2(b) apply for the entire range of values for a and b. In particular, we can use these conditions to conclude that no (symmetric) coordination game can exhibit a cycle.
The preceding discussion should make clear that cardinalities do matter in determining the sort of EPCF that drives any given Prisoners' Dilemma. To emphasize this and to focus on the leading case in which δ is close to unity, we end this section with three examples.
Example 9-1. (Prisoners' Dilemma 1): No EPCF supports the unique dominant strategy Nash equilibrium (and the unique coalition proof Nash equilibrium) as its absorbing state, but cooperation can be supported as the unique absorbing state of a deterministic EPCF for δ close to unity. 23 L R T 1, 1 − 
for any i ∈ N , and any (x , y ) ∈ {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)}. The incentive to move from x to y is captured as follows:
.
First, we find a symmetric equilibrium. Since the game is symmetric, we can describe a symmetric equilibrium in the following way:
By solving the equation we obtain,
where D = (1 − δ + δp) 3 − (δp) 3 > 0, and p denotes the probability to move to the next state.
Thus, a player who is currently getting 0 surely joins a coalitional move. The question is whether a player who is currently getting a would also do so. This can be checked by comparing v H and v M :
Hence, we obtain
. is the unique symmetric EPCF.
The rest of the proof shows that no other EPCF exists. To do that, we need to investigate a few possibilities. We first show that this game does not possess an EPCF that has an absorbing state for any δ and a. Suppose, to the contrary, that p(x, x) = 1 (i.e., x is an absorbing state). Then,
1−δ . Given this, the incentives for players 1 and 2 to move from z to x can be described by the difference between v i (x, p) and v i (z, p):
and
Hence, given that x is an absorbing state, p(z, x) = 1 must follow. Thus, the discounted payoffs at z are
Now, we can check the incentives for players 1 and 3 to move from y to z .
and (y, z) .
Suppose that 1 − δ < a. Then, p(y, z) = 0 must follow. However, if it is so, y is also an absorbing state, and by repeating the same argument before, players 2 and 3 would move from x with probability 1 (p(x, y) = 1). This is a contradiction. Next suppose that 1 − δ ≥ a. Then, p(y, z) ∈ (0, 1] must follow by the argument above. We check if there is any p(y, z) ∈ (0, 1] that can support p(x, y) = 0. The discounted sum of payoffs at y can be written as
Therefore, we obtain,
Now, at state x, we check if p(x, y) = 0 is supportable. Player i's incentives to move from x to y is,
This is a contradiction to p(x, y) = 0. As a result, we conclude that for any a and δ, this game does not possess an absorbing EPCF. So far, we know that p(x , y ) ∈ (0, 1] must hold for any (x , y ) ∈ {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)}. Now, we will show that p(x , y ) ∈ (0, 1) for any (x , y ) ∈ {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)} unless p(x, y) = p(y, z) = p(z, x) = 1. Two sub-cases need to be investigated. The first one is the case with only one deterministic move. Without loss of generality, we assume p(y, z) = 1. Since p(x, y) ∈ (0, 1), we have
These two equations together imply
which is equivalent to
Since p(z, x) ≤ 1, we must have 1 1+δ ≥ a. Now, we move to player 1. Since p(z, x) ∈ (0, 1),
Since p(x, y) ≤ 1, we have . But this contradicts the fact that δ < 1. Next, we consider the remaining subcase in which two moves are deterministic. Suppose, without loss of generality, that p(x, y) ∈ (0, 1) and p(y, z) = p(z, x) = 1. In this case, player 2 has to be indifferent between x and y. Thus,
By equation these two equations, we obtain a = 1 1+δ . Now, we focus on player 3's incentive to move from y to z. We have:
From the first two equations, we obtain:
Substituting a = 1 1+δ into this equation, we obtain,
Thus, we have a formula for v 3 (x, p), δ(1 + δ)p(x, y) ) . Now, to check the incentive to move from y to z, we can calculate v 3 (z, p) − v 3 (y, p).
Equality holds only when p(x, y) = 1. However, it is a symmetric solution for the case of a = 1 1+δ . Therefore, we can conclude that p(x , y ) = 1 cannot happen to any
Finally, we check if there is an asymmetric EPCF when p(x , y ) ∈ (0, 1) for any (x , y ) ∈ {(x, y), (y, z), (z, x)}. Since a player already in a group must be indifferent between staying at x and moving to y , for that player, we can equate v i (x , p) and v i (y , p):
Note that the indifferent players are players 2, 3, and 1 for (x , y ) = (x, y), (y, z), and (z, x), respectively. Since everything is symmetric, we focus on the case of (x , y ) = (x, y). In this case, player 2 is indifferent between x and y. Since 
This is equivalent to
Repeating the same thing to players 1 and 3, we obtain x, p) . Obviously, (i) is satisfied with a strict inequality. Thus, p(w, x) = 1 is incentive compatible. Second, (ii) is investigated. Since the EPCF is fully specified by the previous analysis, it is easy to see the value of v 1 (y, p):
Thus, if (and only if) a ≤ 1 + δ, we can support x as the unique absorbing state of a deterministic EPCF. There are fifteen states in each of these two games, since each coalition structure has only one payoff vector. Define an absorbing deterministic PCF in the following schematic way: 4 . Now, between the two absorbing states, players 1 and 2 prefer x 1 to x 8 , and players 3 and 4 prefer x 8 to x 1 . However, starting from x 1 , players 3 and/or 4 can move only to x 2 , x 3 , and x 6 . All of these states will come back to x 1 . Thus, players 3 and 4 cannot move the state to x 8 without the help of players 1 and/or 2. A parallel argument applies to players 1 and 2 at x 8 , if they try to go to x 1 . There is no temporal gain from those moves, either (given δ ≥ 2 3 ). We have therefore shown that there may be an absorbing deterministic EPCF with no core elements among its absorbing states, and this is true regardless of whether the core is empty or not. . These conditions again guarantee v 3 (y, p) < v 3 (z, p) and V 2 (x) > V 2 (y), respectively, generating the wanted EPCF. For example, δ = 0.8, δ = 0.9 and a = 0.55 satisfy the conditions. This asymmetric result realizes since player 2 cares more about future losses than an immediate gain from a deviation from state x.
